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attempted if a reasonable possibility of success exists.89 Such a possi-
bility existed in Gardner, since the deceased could have fallen over-
board only five minutes before the ship discovered his absence, rather
than five hours before, as defendants suggested. Thus, only after the
ship had searched the waters it had traversed since the deceased was
last seen could it be determined that no reasonable possibility of
rescue existed. If the duty to pursue any reasonable possibility of
rescue is important in fulfilling the obligation of the ship to care for
the seaman and preserve his safety, any reasonable action which
would increase the chance of successful rescue should be undertaken.
Thus, the duty developed in Abbott,9" to use reasonable care to dis-
cover when a seaman is missing, is designed to increase the chance




Interstate Activities of a Hospital Do Not Satisfy Jurisdictional
Requirements of the Sherman Act.
In Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,I the Fourth
Circuit held that the interstate activities of a small, local hospital did
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act.2 In
reaching that conclusion, the court acknowledged two tests for the
determination of Sherman Act jurisdiction: the "directly in com-
merce" test, and the "affecting commerce" test.3 The directly in com-
merce theory requires that the proscribed trade restraint act directly
11 310 F.2d at 287.
Abbott v. United States Lines, Inc., 512 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1975).
, See Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 333 U.S. 821 (1948).
511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S.
October 7, 1975) (No. 74-1452).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). Section 1 provides in relevant part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
." (Emphasis added).
Section 2 provides in relevant part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
...shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ." Id. at § 2.
1 511 F.2d at 681. See also, Mims v. Kemp, 516 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1975).
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upon only the interstate aspect of commerce.4 Under the affecting
commerce test, the relevant question is whether a local activity sub-
stantially influences interstate commerce.' In Rex Hospital, the
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff had not satisfied either test and
hence did not meet the jurisdictional requirements to maintain an
action under the Sherman Act.'
The plaintiff in Rex Hospital, Hospital Building Company
(HBC), sought treble damages and injunctive relief for purported
violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.7 The district court
dismissed HBC's complaint on the ground that the alleged trade
restraints lacked "sufficient connection" with interstate commerce to
bring the provisions of the Sherman Act into play.' The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision.
HBC alleged that its competitors, the trustees of Rex Hospital,
attempted to monopolize the hospital services market in the Raleigh,
North Carolina, area.' The corporation asserted that the defendants
delayed the expansion of HBC's hospital facilities through adverse
publicity campaigns and other tactics designed to impede state au-
thorization"0 of the increase in the hospital unit's bed capacity. Fi-
nally, the corporation implied that the actions of the defendants were
part of a scheme to monopolize hospital services in the Raleigh area.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit did not
Cf. 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 1036 (1975). Because many business activities are multi-
dimensional and have separate interstate aspects to their operations, the courts have
found it necsssary in some instances to isolate the anticompetitive activity and deter-
mine if it is interstate-related in order to apply the directly in commerce theory. See,
e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
3 The affecting commerce test is also subject to the terms of the Sherman Act and
constitutional restrictions. Cf. Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act:
Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1451 (1973). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). As the Fourth
Circuit pointed out in United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975), the courts must relate the alleged anti-competitive activ-
ity to the constitutional limits of the commerce clause power. See text accompanying
note 16 infra. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219 (1948).
511 F.2d at 680.
The action was under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1970), pursuant to §§ 4 & 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 & 26 (1970).
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,428
(E.D.N.C. 1973).
511 F.2d at 681.
" In North Carolina new construction or expansion of hospital facilities requires
an authorization certificate from the state. Id.
1976]
434 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
reach the merits of the corporation's Sherman Act charges. Instead,
the Fourth Circuit disposed of the case by finding an insufficient
connection with interstate commerce to invoke the Sherman Act."
In order to meet the interstate jurisdictional requirements of the
Sherman Act, HBC alleged that its hospital expansion was to be
financed with an out-of-state loan, 2 that the flow of insurance fees
and federal medicare and medicaid payments came from out-of-
state, and that the hospital regularly used interstate modes of com-
munication such as teletype and long distance telephone services.
More specifically, HBC alleged that the annual fee paid to its out-
of-state parent corporation 3 and the percentage of hospital supplies
purchased from sources outside of North Carolina 4 established the
requisite ties with interstate commerce to invoke the Sherman Act.
Other cases have held that jurisdiction was present in situations
where the amount of commerce involved was less than that in Rex
Hospital. "1 Seemingly, therefore, the Fourth Circuit could have found
the jurisdictional requirements to be satisfied without setting a new
precedent, and without transcending the bounds of the original con-
stitutional grant of regulatory commerce power."
The court in Rex Hospital first dismissed HBC's claim that the
" Id.
12 A loan of over $4,000,000 was to be procured from a lending institution outside
of North Carolina to which repayment was to be made in regular installments over a
substantial period of years. Id. at 688.
13 The fee was $36,000 in 1972. Because the fee is based on gross receipts, HBC's
frustrated plans to expand from 49 to 149 beds would mean substantially less revenue
for the parent corporation. HBC advanced the argument that an inhibition of this
growth was a restraint of trade among the states, specifically between HBC's North
Carolina operation and its out-of-state parent corporation. Id.
11 The record showed that HBC's purchase of supplies from out-of-state in 1972
amounted to 80% of its total acquisitions during that year. These purchases, not
including the hospital's food service operation, amounted to $112,846 which included
supplies for its pharmacy, radiology department, electrocardiology operations, and
medical laboratory. Id.
!1 See, e.g., United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1975), where the court found that $9,307
worth of material obtained in interstate commerce was not beyond the jurisdictional
reach of the Sherman Act, 509 F.2d at 1261; Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v.
United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954), where the
court held that total sales of $437,000 was not in itself insubstantial. 210 F.2d at 743.
The amount of out-of-state purchases and loans in Rex Hospital exceeded these cases
in dollar amount. See notes 12 and 14 supra.
" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) rejected the notion that the word "commerce" was primarily
concerned with the traffic of goods transported across state lines; instead, Marshall
stressed that commerce should be viewed broadly. Id. at 4-5.
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alleged conspiracy acted directly in interstate commerce." The
Fourth Circuit based its reasoning primarily on a determination that
hospital services have been historically considered local activities.'
Consequently, the court held that the conduct of the defendant in
Rex Hospital could not have acted directly upon the interstate as-
pects of the hospital business." The Fourth Circuit also concluded
that there was an insufficient impact on interstate commerce to sat-
isfy the affecting commerce test.2 At least arguably there is some
" 511 F.2d at 682.
" Id. The Fourth Circuit relied on United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y,
343 U.S. 326 (1952); Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); and Spears Free Clinic v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir.
1952), to show that hospital services have been considered local activities. There are,
however, important distinctions in these cases that set them apart from the situation
in Rex Hospital.
In Elizabeth Hospital, the alleged trade restraint involved interference in the
referral of patients from out-of-state. The plaintiff in Elizabeth Hospital attempted
to establish the requisite tie with interstate commerce by showing that its purchases
of medical supplies from sources outside the state were substantial. However, the court
in Elizabeth Hospital held that the material issues need not be considered as the
plaintiff failed to assert that the alleged conspiracy interfered with the purchases. 269
F.2d at 170. In Rex Hospital, the alleged Sherman Act violations interfered not only
with the number of patients admitted from out-of-state, but with the entire scope of a
hospital delivery system. 511 F.2d at 688 (Winter, J., dissenting).
Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) involved a charge of conspiracy
to monopolize directed toward a doctor-sponsored corporation engaged in the sale of
prepaid medical care. The Court decided the jurisdictional question by holding that
the number of payments to out-of-state hospitals were too sporadic. 343 U.S. at 334.
Conversely, in Rex Hospital, out-of-state payments by a complete hospital operation
would most certainly occur on a regular, on-going basis.
The rejection of the Sherman Act charge in Spears Free Clinic v. Cleere, supra,
centered on a holding that there was a lack of proof showing an intent to injure,
obstruct or restrain trade, compared to the alleged attempts in Rex Hospital to delay
hospital construction which were never reached on the merits. Still, in Spears Free
Clinic, the court did not hold that hospital services were a purely local activity as a
matter of law. Rather, the court declined to pass upon the question of whether the
practice of the healing arts, including chiropractic, was trade or commerce within the
meaning of the Sherman Act. 197 F.2d at 128.
" 511 F.2d at 680.
, The court labeled the effect in Rex Hospital "de minimis" under the affecting
commerce test. Id. at 685. Interestingly, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1
(4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Fourth Circuit refused to use the de
minimis term and instead utilized a "direct and substantial" test, mixing the elements
of "in commerce" and "affecting commerce" analysis. See text accompanying notes
1-6, supra. In Rex Hospital, however, the Fourth Circuit appeared to follow the guide-
lines established in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942):
But even if [the] activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
1976]
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authority that the activities in Rex Hospital would satisfy the juris-
dictional requirements of either test.
Although the directly in commerce argument on the facts in Rex
Hospital is not as persuasive as the affecting commerce theory, the
directly in commerce argument appears sound in light of the Ninth
Circuit opinion in Rasmussen v. American Dairy Association.2 ' In
that case, an attempt was made to force an artificial milk product
from the market. Although the main ingredient by volume in the
product was local water, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a restraint
of the sale of the other components of the product which originated
out-of-state acted directly upon the flow of commerce.2 2 The Fourth
Circuit rejected the Rasmussen analysis because of the decision to
regard hospital services as local activity. Arguably, however, there
is an analogy between Rasmussen and Rex Hospital. 4 Hospital serv-
ices are made up of components such as medical payments, building
funds, and surgical supplies, some of which may originate in diverse
states. Without the out-of-state financing, insurance payments,
drugs, equipment, and government programs, the corporation could
not have functioned as a hospital, just as the artificial milk product
in Rasmussen would have been merely water without its out-of-state
ingredients.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar25 suggests that the narrow view of Sherman Act jurisdictional
questions used by the Rex Hospital court is becoming outmoded.
However, the Fourth Circuit did not have the benefit of the Court's
holding in Goldfarb when Rex Hospital was decided.21 On the issue
of jurisdiction in Goldfarb, the Court held that a bar association
minimum fee schedule for a title examination and the association's
accompanying enforcement mechanisms sufficiently affected inter-
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and
this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier
time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."
Id. at 125.
21 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
2 The Rasmussen court stated that "for all practical purposes, the out-of-state
ingredients are [the filled milk product]." Id. at 525 (emphasis in original).
1 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the reasoning of Rasmussen by distinguishing the
product involved. "[T]he provision of [hospital] services remains what it always has
been: a local, intrastate activity, not interstate commerce." 511 F.2d at 682.
24 Id. at 683.
5 421 U.S. 773 (1975), rev'g 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
26 The decision in Rex Hospital was handed down on February 18, 1975; Goldfarb
on June 16, 1975.
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state commerce for Sherman Act purposes.Y The Court reasoned that
although a title search was essentially a local, county-based activity,
it was nonetheless an integral part of a larger network of interstate
purchase financing. Similarly, the individual county-based hospital
in Rex Hospital could be viewed as part of a larger system of complete
hospital services which have ever-increasing ties with nationwide fi-
nance plans, insurance payments, and government programs.
In addition to holding that the jurisdictional tests of the Sherman
Act were not met in Rex Hospital, the Fourth Circuit indicated doubt
about the seriousness of the corporation's complaint.2 The court rea-
soned that the construction delay of an addition to a small hospital
such as that in Rex Hospital was not comparable to situations where
Sherman Act jurisdiction had been found when a significant number
of hospitals in a large city were threatened with a shut-down.2 9 This
analysis, however, does not consider the collective effect that the type
of alleged activities in Rex Hospital would have an interstate com-
merce if all small hospitals were prevented from expanding by means
2 421 U.S. at 779. For a discussion of the jurisdictional aspects of Goldfarb, see
The Shifting Jurisdiction of the Antitrust Laws, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. - (1976).
21 The Fourth Circuit found that: "[Tihere is no allegation that the Raleigh
Group has the power to put HBC out of business, or indeed, upon a fair reading of the
whole amended complaint, that it can do any more than delay, at most, whatever
expansion seems economically wise to the plaintiff." 511 F.2d at 685-686.
This appears to reflect a philosophy of Sherman Act policy considerations that
differs from that of Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 361 F.
Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1972), afi'd, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093
(1973). There the court indicated by way of dictum that anti-competitive activity need
not be blatant to contravene the public policy behind the Sherman Act:
The thrust of the Sherman Antitrust Act is the prevention of
restraint-of-trade and monopolistic practices which, by unwarranted
interference with free competition among the suppliers of products or
services, have a tendency to deprive the public of the benefits ordinar-
ily derived from the rivalry of a number of sellers.
481 F.2d at 780 (Emphasis added).
The theme of a vested public interest in curtailing monopoly power is evidenced
in Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967), and United States v. Employing Plasterers
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954). Both cases stressed the practical ill-effects of local business
restraints on the economic well-being of the public, effects which can be quite substan-
tial without placing the alleged victim of monopolistic practices out of business. See
generally Cox, Antitrust Policy Planning and Industry Performance Evaluation, 19
ANTITRUST BULL. 531 (1974).
2! See, e.g., Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 490 F.2d 48 (3d
Cir. 1973), which involved a charge by a hospital that an attempt to corner the hospi-
talization insurance market would effectively close down the hospital, and would place
limits on other area facilities.
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